Introduction
On December 8, 2015, 72-year-old Doug Tompkins, the founder of The North Face, was killed in a kayaking accident on Lake General Carrera, straddling the border between Argentina and Chile in South America. In the weeks that followed, an outpouring of remembrances flowed from newspapers and environmentalists alike. Included in those eulogizing Tompkins was Yvon Chouinard, founder of the equipment company Patagonia and lifelong friend of Tompkins, who had been a member of the paddling expedition that tragically claimed Tompkins's life. 2 Beyond being avid outdoorsmen, Chouinard and Tompkins had over the course of their 50-year friendship revolutionized the outdoor apparel industry, founding two companies that would come to dominate and lead innovation in the market. More than just successful entrepreneurs, the two shared a strong desire to protect the natural environment. However, Chouinard and Tompkins took radically different approaches to fighting environmental degradation. Chouinard positioned his company as a steward for sustainability, investing in green supply chain initiatives, sourcing organic and recycled raw materials, and allocating a percentage of sales each year to grants serving grassroots organizations. In contrast, Tompkins, critical of the role that business played in environmental degradation, exited the corporate world entirely, and used his wealth to buy land in South America in order to preserve and restore the natural environment.
These contrasting strategies provide a new lens on current debates about the ability of business to contribute to environmentalism. Forty years ago, business was broadly believed to be the problem, rather than a potential opportunity, for sustainability; however, during the 1980s a new interpretation emerged of business as a potential savior. Among the milestones was John Elkington's co-authored book entitled The Green Capitalists, published in 1987, which described the importance for sustainability of an emergent group of "environmental entrepreneurs." 3 A decade later Elkington launched the concept of a "triple bottom line" of profitability, environmental quality, and social justice (or people, planet and profit) in a book called Cannibals with Forks. 4 A large scholarly literature has subsequently developed on business and the environment, mostly focused on the sustainability strategies of large corporations. 5 A smaller literature has explored the phenomenon of green entrepreneurship, alternatively known as environmental, eco or sustainable entrepreneurship. 6 Practitioners such as Paul Hawken have made the case of the transformational potential of green entrepreneurship. 7 The scholarly literature has for the most part struggled with clarifying definitional issues, and sought to establish typologies of different types of green entrepreneur. For example, in an early study, Robert Isaak distinguished between "green-green" entrepreneurs, strictly founded on the principles of sustainability, and others. 8 Liz Walley and David Taylor identified four types of green entrepreneur. Within their taxonomy, "visionary champions" were closest to Isaak's greengreen entrepreneurs, businessmen who wanted to make societies and economies more sustainable in a radical fashion. "Ethical mavericks" were also values driven, but their ideas emerged from their networks of friends and lifestyle rather than over-riding visions of changing the world. The two other types of green entrepreneurs were profits rather than values driven. "Innovative opportunists" found ecological concerns a profitable niche, while "ad-hoc" green entrepreneurs stumbled on ecological businesses again through social or other networks. 9 An emergent business history literature has confirmed the argument that there is a considerable diversity of types who might be called green entrepreneurs, as well as demonstrating that the phenomenon has deep historical roots. 10 The primary focus of many studies has often been intent rather than outcomes. This working paper, which is primarily a thought experiment backed up by some empirical data and some major assumptions, addresses the outcomes issue through comparing the different strategies 16 He would never reenter the business world.
Yvon Chouinard
Yvon Chouinard was born in Lisbon, Maine in 1938. A self-described high school "misfit," Chouinard took more of an interest in falconry than academics and joined the Southern California Falconry Club. In order to access falcon aeries located on cliff faces, Chouinard learned how to mountain climb, which immediately became his passion. 17 After leaving Esprit, Tompkins moved to a blighted 42,000 acre farm on the Reñihué fjord in southern Chile. 33 His goal was to protect the plot of rainforest land from deforestation or encroachment from businesses and municipalities. Soon after, Tompkins began expanding his private landholdings by purchasing the surrounding acreage from willing sellers. Tompkins chose
Chile for a variety of reasons. First, the rules for foreign investors were favorable and easy to understand. Second, buying land through his foundations in San Francisco allowed him to avoid paying taxes. Third, the area had very low population density-just 1.2 people per square kilometer-with land titles that were often in disarray. And finally, the region contained several tracts of ancient larch forests that could be purchased at a much lower price per hectare compared to land in Europe or North America. 34 Tompkins established the Conservation Land Trust, endowing the fund with his personal capital and the charter of acquiring more land to build Pumalín Park. Tompkins and the man who would become his longtime attorney, Pedro Pablo Gutierrez, began to map out their buying strategy in 1991. For the most part, the land purchases Tompkins made were not unduly complicated: a small number of people held most of the land that interested him, and many of those landowners were not especially interested in the properties. 35 Tompkins was a fair but steadfast negotiator, sticking to his offered price for months until vendors capitulated. 36 From 1991 to 1998, the trust purchased close to 700,000 acres, 98 percent from absentee landowners. Legislators and the press also complained that Tompkins was pushing poor Chileans, many of whom were barely making a living, off of their land. At times, landowners who accepted money in exchange for their plots quickly bankrupted themselves, then cast Tompkins as the villain. 40 Though Tompkins was quick to defend the legality of his actions and to assert that his intentions were good, public opinion against him mounted. As recounted by journalist Andrés Azócar:
The businessman's efforts to move closer to the community were like tiny boats rowing against the current, and in different directions. The huge number of letters that Tompkins…sent to the newspaper "El Llanqihue" was irrelevant. In them, he tried to explain and repeat that most of the settlers moved to other lands acquired by the businessman in the area-even though they were not entitled to-that he had no intentions of cutting Chile in two, that his park would not restrict access to the public, [ 44 Tompkins's improved government relations may have resulted from his employment of Enrique Correa, a former member of Chilean government, as a lobbyist. 45 The role of Kris
McDivitt, the first CEO of Patagonia, who married Tompkins in 1993, was also important.
McDivitt was savvier in terms of interpersonal relations and public relations than was Tompkins.
She brought containers of Patagonia clothes for employees, followed their lives, and engaged in many other activities that reduced hostility among the people around Tompkins's foundation. 46 According to one of Tompkins's colleagues, "she made him evolve, she humanized him, [and] she turned him into a landholding environmentalist who could also worry about other people." 47 The two executed a large-scale strategy to acquire massive amounts of land for conservation, preservation, and eventual repatriation in several wildlife zones beyond the Pumalín sanctuary. As Patagonia scaled, it began donating every year to small non-profits devoted to habitat restoration. This program was formalized in 1986 when the company created the policy of annually donating ten percent of profits to environmentally-focused organizations; that metric was later raised to one percent of sales. 52 By 2016, the company's donation program had granted $70 million to grassroots activists. 53 Patagonia also began making incremental changes to its internal operation to be more environmentally-friendly. Catalogs were printed on recycled paper, and R&D dollars were spent on developing recycled polyester. 54 From 1991 to 1994, Patagonia took a deep dive to understand and map the full environmental impact of its supply chain, focusing in particular on the damage caused by using its four main inputs: cotton, wool, polyester, and nylon. In the words of Rick Ridgeway, VP of Public Engagement at Patagonia and lifelong friend of both Tompkins and Chouinard:
We mapped our supply chain much more thoroughly than our competitors. [ We made] direct relationships with the secondary and tertiary companies in that chain, including mills and dye houses and extending to a farm and fiber production level. 55 Based on this analysis, Patagonia began making jackets out of recycled polyester and moved to organically-grown cotton in 1996, despite the sourcing change "tripling the company's supply costs." 56 In 1998, ignoring customer demands for the technology, anti-odor chemicals were eliminated given concerns related to the chemicals' impact on the environment. 
Evaluating the benefit of Tompkins's land purchases
The Tompkins's, through their organizations and personal endowment, helped protect roughly 1.5 million hectares in South America. This vast acreage-replete with forests, grasslands, and wetlands-slows the adverse effects of climate change through biomass's storage and sequestering of carbon. According to one expert scientist, the soil and vegetation of
Tompkins's protected areas may store anywhere from 30 to 60 tons of carbon per hectare, depending on the topography of the land. In addition, previously-degraded and carbon-depleted lands that are restored by Tompkins Conservation may restart sequestering carbon from the atmosphere at anywhere from 1.5 to 3 tons per hectare per year. 64 Based on rough assumptions regarding topographical make up, the total sink capacity of Tompkins's sanctuaries-i.e. the amount of carbon that can be stored-approximates 80 million tons of carbon at equilibrium. See Table 2 . In addition, it is important to note, by protecting these habitats indefinitely, Tompkins prevented the future emission of the lands' stored carbon that would have occurred via continued environmental destruction. Compromises on ancient forests are never compromises; they are losses…Ecological concerns are long term; transnational concerns are narrow and short term, exploitive and rarely aimed at preserving integrity and diversity of natural systems. The social justice arguments of jobs versus wilderness always surface-again, short-term thinking versus long-term. 69 Tompkins's approach adds value, then, by forcing long-term perspectives onto a society that, certainly since the rise of shareholder capitalism models in the United States and elsewhere from the 1980s, has mostly over emphasized single-stakeholder and short-term results. 70 
Evaluating Chouinard's business choices and advocacy
Several of Patagonia's internal business initiatives can be measured and are made public by the company. Although the nature and limitation of environmental reporting is a topic and active scholarly debate, 71 it would be churlish not to recognize Patagonia's self-assessment of the impact of its environmental programs since their inception. These initiatives are only a sample of the many changes Patagonia has implemented since the mid-1980s: excess of $100 million to over 3,300 different non-profits. 72 The company has also served as an outside consultant and role model to firms trying to change their own operations to be more sustainable. Wal-Mart enlisted Patagonia's help in piloting changes that reduced water consumption and packaging waste; Levi Strauss utilized Chouinard's supply chain benchmarking to help save 45 million gallons of water annually through more environmentally-friendly production. 73 Patagonia has pioneered and shared standards and methods for incorporating environmental costs into traditional accounting statements. According to Ridgeway, "we have tools that measure footprints and that allow designers to understand the environmental impact of their design choices." 74 Chouinard's and Ridgeway's advocacy has even reached Harvard Business Review; the two co-authored an article promoting retail-wide rating of products according to measured environmental and social impact. 75 
Trade-Offs
Absent an advance in current methodologies and environmental metrics, there is no sensible way to quantify and compare the overall environmental impact of protecting Patagonian habitats versus promoting sustainable manufacturing practices. However it is useful to identify a number of trade-offs in both strategies. The Atlantic:
Tompkins has also beautified the homes of the neighbors, as well as the town's gas station, school, supermarket, and bus shelters. "The people were a little hesitant. A gringo shows up and tells us our town is ugly?"…Tompkins has taken many of the decisions about the design of these renovations into his own handsthe patterns of the houses' trim, the colors of their fences.
were investing in areas they deemed undervalued by society. Tompkins felt compelled to buy as much land as possible because he believed neither businesses nor governments could be trusted to respect the Patagonian wilderness. In this individual episode, the environmental benefits may have been considerable, but the precedent of individual rich people being able to reshape landscapes without the support or consultation of any stakeholder beyond the willing sellers of property had as much potential for adverse than positive environmental outcomes.
Indeed the alignment between a philanthropist wanting to do good and the society in which they execute their plan is thoroughly contested. The controversy over the philanthropy of Roxanne
Quimby -co-founder of the Burt's Bees personal care company -provides a recent example. In 2016, Quimby, when attempting to donate $100 million of land and facilities to create a new national park in Maine, was met with fierce hostility. As detailed in the Washington Post:
[Quimby's] effort has bitterly divided this corner of New England…residents in towns near the proposed park voted against its creation, the governor and legislature are opposed and Maine's congressional delegation [refused] to introduce the measure necessary to create a national park. That [left] only the prospect of President Obama using his authority under the Antiquities Act of 1906 to declare the land a national monument… "It has nothing to do with us anymore," [Millinocket resident] Lorri Haskell said…"it has to do with whether President Obama is going to betray us. Is this how democracy works?" 80 The execution of a vision such as that of Tompkins is of major importance in any overall assessment of impact. One of the key tenets of Tompkins's philosophy was the fact that his ownership of the land was meant to be temporary. As he outlined in an early editorial:
Our feeling is that land purchases must be seen as interim emergency or preemptive measures only. Within a reasonable time (probably 10 to 20 years) transfer of those purchases should be made to return those lands back to the public commons. 81 As the list of national parts in Table 1 , this strategy was implemented. From this perspective,
Tompkins can be absolved from Naomi Klein's critique of "green billionaires" whose rhetoric was not matched by measurable reality. 82 Tompkins's investment in conversation is not easily scalable. However his application of entrepreneurial capabilities and ability to assemble resources to a major environmental issue might well be scalable. It's quite possible that Patagonia's philosophy has attracted many shoppers to the brand without deeply affecting their buying habits, as suggested by the way that "Don't Buy This Jacket" translated, for many, into "Buy This Jacket." 83 The company, despite its environmental and social efforts, at times ran into situations in which delivering on its mission to "build the best product" conflicted with the eco-and sociallyconscious priorities that Patagonia simultaneously stood for. In 2011, an internal audit discovered "multiple instances of human trafficking, forced labor, and exploitation in Patagonia's supply chain." 84 In 2016, Greenpeace, testing a wide variety of outdoor apparel of different brands, found several Patagonia samples that contained hazardous polyflourinated chemicals. 85 Patagonia confirms on its website that the components in its technical shell jackets are potentially harmful.
The company states:
The nylon and polyester polymers we use in our technical shells-which we also use in some of our other products-are neither infinite nor sustainable and the DWR (durable water repellent) finish we apply to our technical shells is potentially toxic to the environment… we've tried all sorts of alternatives to fossil fuel-based shell fabrics by developing fabrics from recycled polyester. But recycled nylon is still less durable, heavier, and harder to obtain in quantity-so we still find ourselves relying on virgin nylon for its durability. 86 Patagonia is willing to make this tradeoff in order to ensure durability. As Ridgeway states:
Durability becomes the main environmental component of a product…If we replace our current water resistant chemistry with what Greenpeace advocates, then durability goes way down so the product has to be replaced more frequently causing more harm than what we currently offer. 87 Certainly, there are some buyers who value the longevity of Patagonia gear and will replace that equipment only when necessary. However, there are other consumers who are more fashion-and tech-driven, willing to replace last year's jacket for today's version. For those customers, Patagonia's choice to use more toxic components may not, in practice, have an impact on the frequency of product replacement. However, if consumers are willing to discard Patagonia's products well before the products themselves wear out-i.e. if consumer preference and not true durability ultimately dictates a product's replacement cycle-then the rationale for using lesseco-friendly components is undermined. The most that can be said is that Patagonia's presence in the apparel market affords consumers the ability to vote for more eco-friendly alternatives by buying the firm's products.
Patagonia's strategy had an evident scalability -far more so than the specific Tompkins strategy of buying huge amounts of land for conservation. The supply chain initiatives that lower waste, save water, and reduce emissions can be and have been adopted by other companies.
Environmental accounting standards that Patagonia created have been adopted by some other companies, both as a way to measure true cost but also as a mechanism for making operations more efficient. Finally, the internal capital earned by Patagonia is exercising can have a sustained Patagonia's systematic and detailed approach to mapping out and tracing the footprint of its products has usefully exposed the often unsustainable and unethical components of the textile manufacturing industry as a whole. The company has worked to improve its supply chain, often going beyond required guidelines to serve as a model for how an apparel operation can and should be managed. As The Atlantic explains:
The status quo throughout the industry…largely requires that companies only look at and remedy labor trafficking issues at their first-tier suppliers. In attempting to monitor and improve the treatment of its second-tier-factory workers, Patagonia is going far beyond that standard. 88 Importantly, Patagonia has set a valuable precedent by being transparent with its own failings.
Rather than hide the fact that some of the company's second-and third-tier Taiwanese suppliers were using exploited labor, Patagonia went public. In the words of Ridgeway:
I was in the meeting when we found out from auditors that we had slave labor in our supply chain. What are we going to do? First thing that came out was we have to go public. We have to tell people about the problem. We have to get supply chain involved. We have to get government involved. You can't fix a system problem without all players in the system coming together. That is our default reaction. 89 By shining a public light on grey areas of the apparel industry's supply chain that no firm had yet investigated, and working with companies and governments to address those issues, the company has promoted system-wide change by implementing solutions to problems that other companies, and consumers, had not identified, or chose to ignore. "They took the low-hanging fruit, recycling plastic, converting their fleet over to natural gas. Things like that. They did everything that ends up making 'em more money. But when it comes down to doing the hard things, anything with a long-term payoff, they backed out…All of these companies, whether it's Dannon or Unilever, they're all greenwashing. They start out making a big deal out of something and they back down. It's like Nike started out doing a little bit of organic cotton, like 1 percent. Now I don't know if they do any at all. The fashion industry, same thing." 90 Chouinard's accusations of greenwashing by specific firms evidently must be regarded entirely as his personal value judgement. However his broad argument is broadly aligned with studies suggesting that many high profile sustainability campaigns by some large companies are primarily strategies to boost bottom line profitability by reducing supply chain costs. Such strategies, one study suggested, "is fundamentally aiming for sustainability of big business, not sustainability of people and the planet."
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Conclusion
This working paper has suggested that both the Chouinard and Tompkins strategies bring positive environmental benefits but with trade-offs and limitations. By trying to improve the apparel system as a member of that system, Patagonia continues to incorporate system-wide downsides. Its customer promise to provide the highest-quality outdoor products requires Patagonia to sell goods that are not 100 percent organic, recycled, or resource-neutral in order to prioritize durability and reduce replacement. Sourcing from developing countries-more or less a mandatory element of any apparel business in today's economy-exposes the company to the risk of working with counterparties that exploit their workforce. The vision was that as the company constantly improved its operations, shared its knowledge, and thrives as a brand, it would become a role model. Patagonia has certainly been studied by high-profile large firms, but it remains the extent to which large public companies have yet replicates the parts of the Patagonia sustainability strategy which involve more than achieving greater cost-efficiency. This might be because a longer time horizon is needed to make a full assessment.
The Tompkins strategy might be seen as one-off and quixotic, and excessively paternalistic, but its positive environmental impact should also be recognized. The estimated sequestering and storage of 80 million tons of carbon is significant in terms of halting the pace of climate change. When that is combined with other environmental gains which cannot be quantified at all, such as saving species from extinction, the net positive environmental impact is greater still. As in the case of Patagonia, Tompkins also engaged in considerable environmental advocacy which must also be seen as a major benefit for the natural environment, even if one which once again there are no metrics to satisfactorily capture the importance of such public voice. The natural environment would clearly benefit from a combined Tompkins/Chouinard approach on pollution and environmental destruction by actors not seeking their commercial exploitation. However the broader take-away from the comparison of these two individuals might be the positive potential for the application of entrepreneurial strategies and capabilities beyond seeking to for-profit businesses more sustainable. Conservation is only one avenue in which this approach could be adopted. 
